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Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality
Abstract
Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household
income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative
mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005
between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini
coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller.
Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force
participation in 2005 is important for this result.
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Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality
By JEREMY GREENWOOD, NEZIH GUNER, GEORGI KOCHARKOV AND CEZAR SANTOS∗
Has there been an increase in positive as-
sortative mating on the marriage market since
1960? How does positive assortative mating in
the marriage market contribute to income in-
equality across households? These two ques-
tions are addressed here. To answer them, sam-
ples of hundreds of thousands of households
from the United States Census Bureau are an-
alyzed for the period 1960 to 2005.
I. The Rise in Positive Assortative Mating
Start with the first question: Has there been
a rise in positive assortative mating in marriage
across U.S. households? To address this ques-
tion, consider a regression between a wife’s ed-
ucational level and her husband’s. In particular,
a regression of the following form is run for the
years y = 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005:
EDU
w
my = α+βEDU
h
my+
∑
t∈T
γ t×EDU
h
my×YEARt y
+
∑
t∈T
θ t×YEARt y+εmy , with εmy ∼ N (0, σ ).
Here EDUhmy and EDU
w
my represent the years of
education for the husband and wife in marriage
m for year y. The variable YEARt y is a time
dummy. It is set up so that YEARt y = 1, if t = y,
and YEARt y = 0, if t 6= y, where t ∈ T ≡
{1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005}. The coefficient
β measures the impact of a husband’s education
on his wife’s for the baseline year 1960, since
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YEARt y = 0, for all t , when y = 1960. The
coefficient γ t gives the additional impact of a
husband’s education on his wife’s relative to the
baseline year, 1960. The evolution of γ t over
time speaks to changes in the degree of assorta-
tive mating. The regression also includes a fixed
effect for each year as measured by the constants
α and θ t . The θ t ’s control for the secular rise
in the educational levels for the married popula-
tion. The lefthand side panel of Figure 1 plots
the upshot of the regression analysis. As can be
seen, γ t rises over time, implying that the degree
of assortative mating has increased.
The levels of education are collapsed into five
categories for the rest of the analysis: less than
high school (H S−), high school (H S), some
college (C−), college (C), and post college
(C+). Kendall’s τ rank correlation is computed
between a husband’s and wife’s education for
each year. The changes in Kendall’s τ over time
are illustrated in Figure 1, righthand side panel.
While the series displays some nonmonotonic-
ity, Kendall’s τ is clearly higher in 2005 relative
to 1960.
Last, the pattern of assortative mating be-
tween a husband’s and wife’s educational levels
can be examined in a contingency table, as the
upper panel in Table 1 does. Each cell in the
contingency table has two entries. The first en-
try gives the observed fraction of married house-
holds in the cell, while the second number dis-
plays the fraction that would occur if matching
was random. The diagonal of the contingency
table describes the matches that occur when hus-
band and wife have identical educational levels,
both for the observed matches and when they are
random. Take sum along the diagonal for each
of these two types of matches, actual and ran-
dom. Next, compute the ratio of the actual to
random matches and denote it by δ. This ratio is
also plotted in Figure 1, righthand side panel, for
the years 1960, 1970, · · · , 2005. First, as can be
seen, there is positive assortative mating. That
is, the ratios are larger than one, implying that
the number of matches between husband and
1
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wife with the identical education level is larger
than what would occur if matching was random.
Second, they increase over time. Greenwood et
al. (2013) present a structural model of this rise
in positive assortative mating.
II. Assortative Mating and Income Inequality
Turn to the second question: How does mari-
tal sorting affect household income inequality?
Interest in this question is not without prece-
dence. For example, Cancian and Reed (1998)
and Schwartz (2010) both conclude that an in-
crease in assortative mating has led to a rise
in income inequality. The current research ad-
dresses this question using an accounting-based
methodology, which is quite different from other
studies. Some income statistics for married
households by educational class are presented in
the lower panel of Table 1. Again, each cell has
two entries. The first number gives the married
household’s income relative to mean income
in the economy across all households, married
and/or single. The second number is the share
of the wife’s labor income in household labor in-
come. In 1960 if a woman with a less-than-high-
school education (H S−) married a similarly ed-
ucated man their household income would be 77
percent of mean household income. If that same
woman married a man with a college education
(C) then household income would be 124 per-
cent of the mean. Alternatively, in 2005 if a
woman with post-college education (C+) mar-
ries a man with a less-than-high-school educa-
tion their income would be 92 percent of mean
household income. This rises to 219 percent if
her husband also has a post-college education.
So, at some level, sorting matters for household
income.
A. Constructing Lorenz Curves and Gini
Coefficients
Let fi j denote the fraction of households in
the U.S. that are of type i in income percentile
j and ri j represent the income of such a house-
hold relative to mean household income. The
percentile index j is expressed in terms of frac-
tions (e.g., 0.10 instead of 10). The types are
classified as follows: There are married and sin-
gle households. In a married household each
person is indexed by one of the above educa-
tional levels. The wife is also categorized by
whether she works or not. There are ten income
percentiles (deciles) so j ∈ {0.1, 0.2, · · · , 1.0}.
This leads to 550 (i, j)-combinations of house-
holds in total for each year. The share of aggre-
gate income that percentile j accounts for, s j , is
given by s j =
∑
i fi jri j . The cumulative share
of income at percentile p is thus lp ≡
∑p
j s j =∑p
j
∑
i fi jri j . A Lorenz curve plots lp against
p =
∑p
j
∑
i fi j . The Gini coefficient, g, is
twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the
450 line. If p moves continuously then the Gini
coefficient is defined by g = 2
∫ 1
0
|lp − p|dp,
where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1. A higher value for g im-
plies a greater degree of income inequality. The
Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient are clearly
functions of the fi j ’s and the ri j ’s, for all i and
j , so write lp = LORENZ p({ fi j }, {ri j }) and g =
GINI({ fi j }, {ri j }).
The Lorenz curves for 1960 and 2005 are pic-
tured in the lefthand side panel of Figure 2. They
show a rise in inequality. The Gini coefficient
rises from 0.34 to 0.43. The righthand side panel
shows the relative income for each percentile. In
1960 a household at the 10th percentile earned
16 percent of mean income. This dropped to 8
percent in 2005. A household in the 90th per-
centile earned 251 percent of mean income in
1960 versus 317 percent in 2005. Incomes are
more polarized in 2005. The change in wages
across individuals is the primary driver of this
increase in income inequality.
B. Assortative versus Random Matching
Suppose that matching was random instead of
assortative. What would have happened to the
income distributions in 1960 and 2005? To do
this experiment the observed pattern of match-
ing for married couples shown in the contin-
gency table is replaced by the pattern that would
occur if matching was random. Let M repre-
sent that set of indices for married couples and
S be the set for singles. The experiment in-
volves replacing the observed { fi j }’s for (i, j) ∈
M with the set that would obtain if match-
ing was random, denoted by { f̃i j } for (i, j) ∈
M. The counterfactual Lorenz curve and Gini
coefficient are given by LORENZ p({ f ′i j }, {ri j })
and GINI({ f ′i j }, {ri j }), where { f
′
i j } ≡ { f̃i j }M ∪
{ fi j }S .
The results of the counterfactual experiment
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are interesting. Moving from the observed pat-
tern of assortative matching in 1960 to a ran-
dom pattern has little discernible impact on in-
come inequality. The Gini coefficient drops only
slightly to 0.33. Repeating the experiment for
2005 has a marked impact on the income distri-
bution, that is shown in the lefthand side panel
of Figure 3. As can be seen, the Lorenz curve
shifts in and the Gini drops from 0.43 to 0.34.
(The analogous diagram for 1960 is not shown
since the shift in the Lorenz curve is not no-
ticeable.) Why does this experiment affect the
Lorenz curve for 2005 but not 1960? This ques-
tion will be addressed now.
C. Matching and Married Female Labor-Force
Participation
For positive assortative matching to have an
impact on income inequality married females
must work. Married females worked more in
2005 than 1960. The righthand side panel of
Figure 4 shows married female labor-force par-
ticipation by percentile. As can be seen, across
all income percentiles labor-force participation
was higher in 2005 versus 1960, but the increase
is most precipitous at the highest percentiles.
For example, at the 80th percentile 42 percent
of married women worked in 1960. This rose to
77 percent in 2005. At the 20th percentile the
numbers are 25 and 34 percent. The lefthand
side panel of Figure 4 shows the contribution of
the wife’s labor income to household labor in-
come, again by percentile. The wife’s contribu-
tion to household labor income is significantly
larger in 2005 relative to 1960. This share rises
with the income percentile. At the 80th per-
centile the share that married woman provided
to household income rose from 16 to 34 percent,
and from 13 to 25 percent at the 20th percentile.
To examine the impact of married female
labor-force participation (MFLP) and sorting on
income inequality, undertake this thought ex-
periment. Assume that matching is random in
the years 1960 and 2005 with one twist: as-
sume that in 1960 married woman participate in
the labor force at their 2005 levels and that in
2005 they work at their 1960 levels. The result-
ing Gini coefficients are 0.32 and 0.45. When
matching is random, married female labor-force
participation has a significant dampening effect
on income inequality for the year 2005. Ran-
dom sorting works to equalize incomes across
households in 2005 because it diversifies in-
come across husbands and wives. But, this ef-
fect is only operational to the extent that mar-
ried women work. (That is, for 2005 compare
0.34 with 0.45.) Random matching has less of
an effect in 1960 than in 2005. Incomes are less
polarized in 1960, as Figure 1 and Table 1 both
show.
Another interesting question to ask is what
would have happened to income inequality if
couples in 2005 matched as in 1960. That is, re-
place the 2005 contingency table with the 1960
one. This experiment is somewhat tricky to op-
erationalize. In 2005 people were much more
educated than in 1960. The fractions of wives
(husbands) in the various educational groups
can be obtained by summing each column (row)
across the rows (columns). In other words, the
marginal distributions for husbands and wives
linked with the contingency tables have changed
across 1960 and 2005. The marginal distribu-
tions for females are shown in Table 1, upper
panel. The rise in educational attainment for fe-
males is readily apparent.
A standardized contingency table for the
years 1960 and 2005 can be constructed to
control for this. The essential idea is that
shifts in the marginal distributions across non-
standardized contingency tables can distort the
comparison of the core patterns of association
between the variables in the tables. Using the
iterative procedure outlined in Mosteller (1968),
a contingency table for 1960 can be computed
using the 2005 marginal distributions over edu-
cational categories for husbands and wives. An-
other one can be built for 2005 using the 1960
marginal distributions. (These standardized con-
tingency tables, and the method for generating
them, are presented in the online appendix.) A
comparison of the 1960 contingency table from
the data with the standardized one for 2005
shows an increase in assortative mating. The
(straight) sum of the diagonals rises from 0.54 to
0.60. (A comparison of 1960 standardized con-
tingency table with the one in the data for 2005
also shows an increase along the diagonal from
0.44 to 0.48.) The Gini coefficients associated
with these two standardized tables are 0.34 and
0.35. Therefore, if people matched in 2005 ac-
cording to the 1960 standardized mating pattern
there would be a significant reduction in income
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inequality; i.e., the Gini drops from 0.43 to 0.35.
The inward shift in the Lorenz curve is shown in
the righthand side panel of Figure 3.
Last, take the 1960 standardized table and ad-
ditionally impose the 2005 levels of married fe-
male labor-force participation. Likewise, force
the 1960 levels of married female labor-force
participation on the 2005 standardized contin-
gency table. Now, the Gini coefficients are 0.33
and 0.44. Income inequality rises for 2005 (from
0.35 to 0.44). By shutting down married female-
labor participation for 2005 income inequality
worsens. The Lorenz curve for this experiment
virtually lies on top of the one from the data for
2005 (but shifts very slightly outward), so it is
not shown in Figure 3. This illustrates the im-
portance of married female labor-force partici-
pation for understanding income inequality. The
results of the experiments are catalogued in Ta-
ble 2. So, if people matched in 2005 accord-
ing to the standardized mating pattern observed
in 1960, which showed less positive assortative
matching, then income inequality would drop
because income is more diversified across hus-
band and wife. For this effect to function fe-
males need to work in 2005, as they did, or di-
versification in household income can’t operate.
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FIGURE 1. THE RISE IN POSITIVE ASSORTATIVE MATING, 1960-2005
Note: The variables γ t , τ t and δt are measures of assortative mating for the years t = 1960, 1970, · · · , 2000, 2005. A higher value
for a variable shows a higher degree of positive assortative mating. See the text for a description of the variables.
Source: See the online appendix for a description of the data used in all figures and tables.
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FIGURE 2. INCOME INEQUALITY, 1960 AND 2005
Note: The righthand side panel shows average income for a household in the j-th percentile relative to mean household income in the
economy. The lefthand side panel shows the Lorenz curves for 1960 and 2005. See the online appendix for more detail on how the
Lorenz curves are constructed.
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FIGURE 4. MARRIED FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION, 1960 AND 2005
Note: The righthand side panel shows married female labor-force participation by income percentile for 1960 and 2005. The lefthand
side panel illustrates the share of the wife’s labor income in household labor income.
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TABLE 1—CONTINGENCY TABLE: ASSORTATIVE MATING AND INCOME BY EDUCATIONAL CLASS
Marital Sorting by Education
1960
Husband Wife
HS- HS C- C C+
HS- 0.3231 0.2072 0.138 0.192 0.019 0.053 0.004 0.026 0.001 0.008
HS 0.076 0.118 0.165 0.110 0.028 0.031 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.004
C- 0.018 0.045 0.051 0.042 0.027 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.002
C 0.005 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.019 0.008 0.018 0.004 0.003 0.001
C+ 0.003 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.003 0.008 0.001
Marginal, Wives 0.425 0.396 0.110 0.054 0.016
2005
HS- 0.039 0.006 0.031 0.027 0.010 0.020 0.003 0.020 0.001 0.010
HS 0.023 0.024 0.192 0.114 0.082 0.084 0.037 0.084 0.012 0.041
C- 0.005 0.015 0.065 0.073 0.088 0.054 0.047 0.053 0.016 0.026
C 0.002 0.015 0.030 0.072 0.045 0.053 0.104 0.053 0.037 0.026
C+ 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.043 0.018 0.032 0.050 0.032 0.053 0.015
Marginal, Wives 0.070 0.329 0.242 0.241 0.118
Marital Income by Education
1960
HS- 0.7653 0.1314 0.918 0.147 1.040 0.204 1.243 0.356 1.395 0.415
HS 0.935 0.101 1.031 0.119 1.148 0.168 1.344 0.263 1.581 0.358
C- 1.071 0.106 1.185 0.113 1.278 0.139 1.442 0.196 1.593 0.328
C 1.234 0.080 1.349 0.076 1.420 0.080 1.529 0.121 1.673 0.222
C+ 1.357 0.087 1.476 0.083 1.568 0.090 1.631 0.126 1.764 0.215
2005
HS- 0.409 0.219 0.586 0.346 0.692 0.415 0.904 0.462 0.918 0.522
HS 0.554 0.221 0.827 0.319 0.932 0.376 1.166 0.447 1.327 0.503
C- 0.661 0.190 0.958 0.278 1.042 0.337 1.255 0.402 1.434 0.485
C 0.852 0.195 1.250 0.229 1.335 0.256 1.600 0.308 1.793 0.389
C+ 1.303 0.165 1.495 0.199 1.666 0.202 1.896 0.224 2.193 0.333
Note: Each cell in the contingency table has two entries. In the top panel they refer to 1) the observed matching pattern between
husband and wife and 2) what would happen if matching was random matching. In the bottom panel they denote 3) household income
relative to mean income across all households and 4) the share of the wife’s labor income in total household labor income. Household
income is adjusted by an equivalence scale to account for the differences in household size (including children) in each cell. The row
marked marginal gives the fraction of females in each educational category; i.e., the marginal distribution over education for females.
Source: Again, see the online appendix for a description of the data used in all figures and tables.
TABLE 2—GINI COEFFICIENTS, DATA AND EXPERIMENTS
Basis for Gini Coefficient 1960 2005
Data 0.34 0.43
Random Matching 0.33 0.34
Random + 2005 MFLP 0.32
Random + 1960 MFLP 0.45
Standardized Table 0.34 0.35
Standardized Table + 2005 MFLP 0.33
Standardized Table + 1960 MFLP 0.44
Note: The online appendix contains additional information on the methodology used to generate this table.
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ONLINE APPENDIX: GREENWOOD, GUNER, KOCHARKOV AND SANTOS (2014)
A1. Data
The data used for this paper is freely available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) website. The samples used in this study are taken from the 1 percent sample of the Census
for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for the
year 2005. The following variables were included for every year: year or the survey (variable name:
year), spouse location flag (sploc), number of family members in the household (famsize), number
of children in the household (nchild), age (age), sex (sex), marital status (marst), educational attain-
ment (educ), employment status (empstat), total family income (ftotinc), wage and salary income
(incwage). Only singles and married couples that are 25 to 54 years old are considered. The adults
in these households either live by themselves or with their children, who are less than 19 years old.
Households in which there are other members such as grandparents, uncles/aunts, or other unrelated
individuals are excluded. Households with subfamilies of any other type are also excluded from the
analysis. Finally, widows, widowers and married individuals whose spouses are absent are excluded
as well. Income variables are restricted to be non-negative.
There are 560 types of households used in the analysis. Households are broken down into finer
categories than are reported in the text. In principle, this doesn’t affect the analysis, since the finer
classifications can be combined to attain the more aggregated ones. Following a counterfactual ex-
periment, some households are moved into new income percentiles. So, in practice the finer clas-
sification allows more accurate re-sorting into the various income percentile when conducting the
counterfactual experiments. Households are classified into different types as follows:
1) Marital status: married, never married males, never married females, divorced males, divorced
females.
2) Education: less than high school, high school, some college, college, more than college. For
married households, both the husband and wife will have one of these educational levels.
3) Market work: work, does not work. For married households both the husband and wife will
have one of these levels of labor market activity.
4) Children: no children, 1 child, 2 children, more than 2 children.
Finally, households are divided into 10 deciles. So, for every year, there are 5,600 (i, j)-combinations
of household types/deciles.
A2. The Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient
Think of a sample of different household types, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, situated in different percentiles,
j ∈ J , of the income distribution. Again, j is expressed as a fraction. Define fi j as the fraction
of households that are of type-i in income percentile j . Let ri j represent household (i, j)’s income,
yi j , relative to mean income, y. Each household’s income is adjusted to a per-adult-equivalent basis
using the OECD modified equivalence scale, which counts the first adult as 1, the second adult as 0.5
and each child as 0.3 adults. Equivalized households incomes are then divided by mean household
income across the whole sample.
The share of income earned by percentile j is
s j =
∑
i
fi jri j .
The Lorenz curve is derived by plotting the cumulative shares of the population indexed by percentile
p,
p =
p∑
j
m∑
i
fi j
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FIGURE A1. THE LORENZ CURVE AND GINI COEFFICIENT
Note: The figure shows the construction of a Lorenz curve when there are four percentiles (quartiles). The Gini coefficient is twice the
area between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve.
on the x-axis, against the cumulative share of income indexed by percentile p,
lp =
p∑
j
s j ,
on the y-axis. Suppose that the unit interval is split up into n equally sized segments. Then, j
∈ J = {1/n, · · · , 1− 1/n, 1}.
Take the example of n = 4 (quartiles). The Lorenz curve described above is plotted in Figure 1.
The Gini coefficient associated with the Lorenz curve equals twice the area between the Lorenz curve
and the 45-degree line. Alternatively, the coefficient can be calculated as equaling 1− 21, where 1
is the area below the Lorenz Curve. In the case of quartiles the area 1 is the summation of the areas
of the right triangle A, the right trapezoids B, C , and D. The coordinates on the x-axis are given by
0, p1 = 0.25, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.75, and 1.0. The y-axis coordinates of the Lorenz curve are given
by 0, l0.25, l0.5, l0.75, and 1.0.
Then, using the formulas for the geometric areas A, B, C , and D, the Gini coefficient, g, can be
derived as
g = 1− 2
 p1l12︸︷︷︸
Area A
+
(l1 + l2)(p2 − p1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Area B
+
(l2 + l3)(p3 − p2)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Area C
+
(l3 + 1)(1− p3)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Area D
 .
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After rearranging and canceling out terms, the expression for the Gini coefficient can be simplified to
g = (p1l2 − p2l1)+ (p2l3 − p3l2)+ (p3 − l3).
The cumulative shares of the population, the p’s, are based on quartiles; i.e., p1 = 1/4, p2 =
2/4, · · · . Thus, above expression can be rewritten as
g =
1
4
[(l2 − 2l1)+ (2l3 − 3l2)+ (3− 4l3)] .
In the more general case of n percentiles, the Gini coefficient equals
g =
1−1/n∑
p=1/n
[plp+1 − (p + 1/n)lp].
The version of this formula for an arbitrary number of income groups of any size and an arbitrary
number of sub-populations (types) is presented in Rao (1969).
A3. Counterfactual Experiments
IMPOSING RANDOM MATCHING
Random matching can be imposed on the demographic structure of the U.S. population for each of
these years in the sample. Counterfactual Gini coefficients can then be computed. How is this done?
First a bit of notation. Take the distribution of household, { fi j }. Recall that married households are
indexed by the education of the husband, the education of the wife, their labor-force participation,
and the number of children in the household. Let the sets MEH contain the indices of all married
households with a husband who has the educational level, EH ∈ {H S−, H S,C−,C,C+}, where
H S− refers to a less-than-high-school educated person, H S refers to someone with a high-school
education, C− is some college, C is college, and C+ is more-than-college educated. Similarly, the
setsMEW contain married households with different educational levels for wives, EW . Furthermore,
ML F PH (ML F PW ) contain all the married households with a husband’s (wife’s) labor-force partici-
pation status L F PH(W ) ∈ {W O RK H(W ), ~W O RK H(W )}. Finally, the set MK I DS contain married
households with a particular number of children K I DS ∈ {0, 1, 2, 2+}. The set of all married
households with a particular mix of the education,MEH ,EW , for the husband and the wife reads
MEH ,EW =MEH ∩MEW .
LetM represent the set containing all of the different types of married households. Clearly,
M =
⋃
EH ,EW ,L F PH ,L F PW ,K I DS
(MEH ∩MEW ∩ML F PH ∩ML F PW ∩MK I DS),
where the term in parenthesis is the set of all married households of type (EH , EW , L F PH ,
L F PW , K I DS).
Here is an example illustrating how the random matching experiment is performed. Take the first
element of the matching table in 1960–see Table 1 of the main text. These are the marriages where
both the husband and the wife are less-than-high-school educated. In 1960, the fraction of such
marriages was 0.32. In terms of the current notation,∑
i∈MH S−,H S−
∑1
j=0.1 f
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f
1960
i j
= 0.32.
Now impose the random matching table entry for these marriages–again, see Table 1 of the main text.
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The fraction of such marriages, if matching in 1960 was random, is 0.21. Denote the counterfactual
distribution to be imposed in 1960 by f̃ 1960i j . The following equation must hold for the particular
marriage group being discussed∑
i∈MH S−,H S−
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f
1960
i j
= 0.21.
The elements in the contingency table refer to the fraction of all married households that a particular
type of match between husbands’ and wives’ educational levels constitutes. The elements in the cells
are totals across all income percentiles. The fi j ’s refer to the fraction of all households, married
and single, that are of type i in income percentile j . Therefore, the cells in the contingency table are
aggregated over income percentiles (as well as the other non-educational traits characterizing married
households). The ratio of the total number of type-(H S−, H S−) marriages under random matching
to what occurs in the data is∑
i∈MH S−,H S−
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j∑
i∈MH S−,H S−
∑1
j=0.1 f
1960
i j
=
0.21
0.32
= 0.66.
So, under random matching the number of type-(H S−, H S−) marriages is reduced by factor of
0.66 = 0.21/0.31. Assume that this reduction is spread out evenly across all of the income per-
centiles, or across all of the j’s. Therefore, when undertaking the random matching experiment,
f̃ 1960i j should be constructed as follows:
f̃ 1960i j =
0.21
0.31
f 1960i j , for i ∈MH S−,H S− and all j .
A similar scaling operation is performed for each of the other 24 possible matches. Thus, there is a
scaling factor specific to each type of marriage (in the contingency table). For all single and divorced
people, keep the original fractions; i.e., f̃ 1960i j = f
1960
i j .
IMPOSING RANDOM MATCHING WHILE HOLDING FIXED MARRIED FEMALE LABOR-FORCE
PARTICIPATION
The impact of random matching on inequality can be interacted with changes in the labor-force
participation decisions of married females. The procedure for imposing random matching in 1960
is outlined in the previous section. Suppose that in addition to imposing random matching in 1960,
married female labor-force participation is fixed at its 2005 level. How can this be implemented?
The married female labor-force participation rate in 1960 when random matching is imposed is∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j
= 0.33,
while the labor-force participation rate in 2005 is∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1 f
2005
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f
2005
i j
= 0.68.
Denote the desired new counterfactual distribution for married households in 1960 by f̂ 1960i j , for
i ∈M and all j . This new counterfactual distribution for 1960 must give the 2005 married female
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labor-force participation rate so∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1 f̂
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f̂
1960
i j
= 0.68.
Bear in mind that the fraction of married people in 1960 does not change in the counterfactual exper-
iments; i.e., ∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f 1960i j =
∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j =
∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̂ 1960i j .
Consequently,∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1 f̂
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j
=
0.68
0.33
∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1 f̃
1960
i j
= 0.68.
Imposing a labor-force participation rate from 2005 onto the 1960 counterfactual distribution of ran-
dom matching amounts to scaling up all (i, j)-combinations of married households in which women
work. On the other hand, the married households in which women do not work should be scaled
down so that the total fraction of married households does not change.
Therefore, the counterfactual distribution, { f̂ 1960i j }, should be constructed in the following way:
f̂ 1960i j =
0.68
0.33
f̃ 1960i j , for i ∈MW O RKW and all j ,
and
f̂ 1960i j =
1− 0.68
1− 0.33
f̃ 1960i j , for i ∈M~W O RKW and all j .
This way the total fraction of married households stays constant,∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̂ 1960i j =
∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1
f̂ 1960i j +
∑
i∈M~W O RKW
∑1
j=0.1
f̂ 1960i j
=
0.68
0.33
∑
i∈MW O RKW
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j +
1− 0.68
1− 0.33
∑
i∈M~W O RKW
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j
= 0.68
∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j + (1− 0.68)
∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j
=
∑
i∈M
∑1
j=0.1
f̃ 1960i j .
As with the previous counterfactual distribution adjustment, keep the original fractions, f̂ 1960i j =
f 1960i j , for all single and divorced people.
A4. Standardizing Contingency Tables
Mosteller (1968) suggests that when comparing two contingency tables they should first be stan-
dardized so that they both have the same marginal distributions associated with the rows and columns.
Take a 5×5 table. It can be standardized so that each element of the two marginal distributions is 1/5.
This can be done by employing the Sinkhorn-Knopp (1967) algorithm, which iteratively scales each
row and column. Standardization preserves the core pattern of association in a contingency table.
For example, Tan, Kumar and Srivastava (2004) note that such standardization does not affect the
odds ratios in a contingency table, a typical measure used to gauge the pattern of association between
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variables.
SINKHORN-KNOPP (1967) ALGORITHM
1) Enter an iteration with a contingency table.
2) This contingency table has a marginal distribution associated with the rows (for men) ob-
tained by summing each row along its columns to obtain a total for that row. Divide each
row through by 5 times its total. The marginal distribution associated with the rows is now
(1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5).
3) Compute the marginal distribution associated with the columns (for women) by summing each
column along its rows to obtain a total for that column. Divide each column through by its 5
times its total.
4) Recompute the marginal distribution associated with the rows. It has changed follow-
ing the previous two steps. Check its distance from the desired marginal distribution
(1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5). If it has reached the desired level of closeness then stop. If not,
go back to Step 1.
THE STANDARDIZED TABLES
The two resulting standardized tables for 1960 and 2005 are shown in Table A1. The diagonal
elements in the 2005 table are larger than in the 1960 one. Assortative mating has increased.
There is no need to standardize the tables so that each element of the marginal distributions is 1/5.
One can standardize the 1960 table so that its marginal distributions coincide with those in the data
for 2005, or vice versa. This way the standardized table for 1960 (2005) can be compared with the
one from the data for 2005 (1960). Both tables will have the same 2005 (1960) marginal distributions.
This results are shown in Table A2. By comparing the standardized table for 1960 with the one in the
data for 2005 (see Table 1 in the text) it can be seen that assortative mating has increased. Once again,
the diagonal elements are larger in the table for 2005. Likewise, a comparison of the standardized
table for 2005 with the one in the data for 1960 shows an increase in assortative mating (again, see
Table 1 in the text).
A5. A Brief Literature Review
The increase in assortative mating in the U.S. has also been examined by Hou and Myles (2008),
Lam (1997), Qian and Preston (1993), and Schwartz and Mare (2005) to name a few papers. Siow
(2013) documents an increase in educational homogamy, but not a general increase in positive as-
sortative matching. Lam (1997) and Schwartz (2010) discuss the relationship between assortative
mating and income inequality. Cancian and Reed (1998, 1999) also focus on the role that married
female-labor force participation plays in the relationship between assortative mating and income in-
equality.
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TABLE A1—STANDARDIZED CONTINGENCY TABLE: ASSORTATIVE MATING BY EDUCATIONAL CLASS
Marital Sorting by Education
1960
Marginal Distributions = (1/5, · · · , 1/5)
Husband Wife
HS- HS C- C C+
HS- 0.126 0.043 0.017 0.007 0.007
HS 0.046 0.079 0.038 0.019 0.017
C- 0.020 0.045 0.067 0.037 0.032
C 0.005 0.023 0.047 0.081 0.043
C+ 0.002 0.010 0.031 0.055 0.102
Marginal, Wives 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
2005
Marginal Distributions = (1/5, · · · , 1/5)
HS- 0.146 0.035 0.014 0.004 0.002
HS 0.035 0.088 0.047 0.019 0.011
C- 0.013 0.047 0.079 0.038 0.023
C 0.004 0.021 0.039 0.082 0.054
C+ 0.002 0.010 0.022 0.057 0.109
Marginal, Wives 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
Note: The upper panel shows the contingency table for 1960 when it has been normalized using the Sinkhorn-Knopp algorithm so that
each element of marginal distributions over education for men and women equals 1/5. The lower panel shows the same thing for 2005.
TABLE A2—STANDARDIZED CONTINGENCY TABLE: ASSORTATIVE MATING BY EDUCATIONAL CLASS
Marital Sorting by Education
1960
Using the 2005 Marginal Distributions
Husband Wife
HS- HS C- C C+
HS- 0.029 0.035 0.011 0.005 0.003
HS 0.030 0.186 0.072 0.040 0.019
C- 0.008 0.065 0.079 0.048 0.022
C 0.002 0.032 0.055 0.101 0.028
C+ 0.001 0.010 0.025 0.048 0.047
Marginal, Wives 0.070 0.329 0.242 0.241 0.118
2005
Using the 1960 Marginal Distributions
HS- 0.354 0.114 0.015 0.002 0.000
HS 0.054 0.183 0.033 0.007 0.001
C- 0.011 0.054 0.031 0.008 0.001
C 0.004 0.027 0.017 0.019 0.003
C+ 0.002 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.009
Marginal, Wives 0.425 0.396 0.110 0.054 0.016
Note: The upper panel shows the contingency table for 1960 when it has been normalized using the Sinkhorn-Knopp algorithm so that
the marginal distributions for men and women over education equal what there are in the data for 2005. The lower panel shows the
contingency table for 2005 when it has been normalized so that the marginal distributions for men and women equal what there are in
the data for 1960.
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